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Discussant's Response to "Why the Auditing
Standards on Evaluating Internal Control
Needed to be Replaced"
William R. Kinney, Jr.
University of Texas at Austin
In a way, I feel that I should apologize for not joining Jerry and the AICPA
Auditing Division leadership in supporting their response to the alleged
expectations gap. One would like to support the profession that one studies and
about which one teaches. However, it is traditional for a scholarly discussant to
take a position contrary to that of the author. That will be easy for me to do
since, as most of you know, I hold a contrary view on the need to replace AU
320.
It is also traditional to critically discuss a paper on the basis of its own
criteria and to discuss the topic of the paper from an alternative perspective. I
will follow the traditional approach, but in reverse order. I will begin by giving a
little background on the role of Statements on Auditing Standards (SASs) in
general, and the role and importance of AU 320 or Statement of Auditing
Procedure (SAP) No. 54.

GAAS and SASs
As we all know, SASs are codified interpretations of Generally Accepted
Auditing Standards (GAAS). They are quasi-legal in nature and help define
acceptable practice under the securities acts as well as within the ethical rules
of the profession. Codified professional standards play two important and
related roles. They serve a before-the-fact educational role of guiding the
auditor as to what should be done to conduct a "standard quality" audit under
GAAS. They also serve an after-the-fact enforcement role in determining
whether an auditor has been guilty of "malpractice." The first helps the
profession by facilitating uniform, high quality audits and the second helps the
profession by making it easier to disassociate itself from low quality audits.
Thus, the SASs are important and they should be clearly worded and be readily
interpretable.
Traditionally, SASs have related almost exclusively to the effectiveness of
audits—that is, regulation to make sure that audits are effective in achieving
appropriately low audit risk that error might exceed material limits. Some
practitioners read the SASs as providing minimum requirements for a legal
defense, and the minimum is their target. Without auditor quality differentiation, the SASs may also provide the maximum service in a competitive market.
Therefore, it is important to have the effectiveness minimum clearly stated.
Efficiency, or the achievement of a given level of audit risk at minimum cost,
has, with rare exception, been left unregulated or left without comment by the
55

Auditing Standards Board (ASB) for two reasons. First, in a competitive
market, practitioners can be expected to be efficient on their own. Second,
there is no long-run danger to the public of inefficient auditing—the market will
discipline inefficient auditors.
SAP No. 54 (now AU 320) has had a revolutionary, and I believe salutary,
effect on auditing practice, education, and research. Several generations of
professors, textbook writers, students, and regulators have learned about the
inherent limitations of internal control and the related necessity of substantive
testing, the reasons behind segregation of duties, the necessity of compliance
testing if controls are to be relied upon, the logical basis for evidence
integration, and the basic concepts of control of audit risk. It has stood the test
of time in practice and in research—many professors have tried to shoot holes
in it and could not. Perhaps most important to us here, it gave a conceptual
evidence model of auditing that has provided the basis for respect for auditing
professors on campus. Many of us in this room are here due, in part, to SAP
No. 54.
Certainly AU 320 is not perfect and it could use some updating and editing.
In that regard, many of you are aware of my controversial letter of March 26,
1987 to Alan Winters. It was a response to his invitation to comment on the
exposure draft (ED) of SAS No. 55. I read the ED with the view that, I
believed, a skeptical, ''minimum requirements-seeking" practitioner or accountant's defense attorney might take. Since AU 320 would be eliminated by
the ED, I tried to read the ED without reliance on what I knew was in AU 320
because the next generation of students, auditors, and "enforcers" will have
to read, understand, and apply SAS No. 55 cold!
In his response to the planning subcommittee (May 15, 1987), and the
entire ASB (June 2, 1987), Al stated that there was little problem with the
exposure draft but that I simply didn't read the words as he had meant them.
The latter is true, of course. Both letters are in the public record if you wish to
study the issues for yourself. I encourage you to try to read SAS No. 55 from
the perspective of one who doesn't already know about AU 320.
I am pleased to say that I believe the current draft of SAS No. 55 is a
considerable improvement over the exposure draft of last year. This is
because, in effect, it adds back a number of the AU 320 concepts. Whether the
present draft of SAS No. 55 is a net improvement over AU 320, or indeed, if
the benefits of its passage outweigh its costs, is not at all clear to me.
The net benefits of SAS No. 55 are also not clear to others as evidenced by
the fact that six ASB members had dissents or qualified assents to its issuance.
Their number includes partners from five national accounting firms and the
accounting professor, Jim Loebbecke. The audit firms are Ernst and Whinney,
Grant Thornton, Laventhol & Horwath, Peat Marwick Main, and Price
Waterhouse. Their stated concerns include illogical reasoning, confusing
exposition that is likely to lead to over-reliance on controls, unnecessary
changes of wording with no change in concept, and the need for stronger
procedures to support the auditor's "understanding" of the control structure.
That is, the dissenters are asking for more rigor as to effectiveness and more
clarity!
This reception by a substantial minority of Board members can be
contrasted with that of SAS No. 47 on Audit Risk and Materiality. SAS No. 47
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was peculiar in that it added "structure" to the official literature, but its task
force chairman (a Big-Eight partner and ASB member) wanted a 15-0 vote and
held up a ballot draft until all objections by all parties were accommodated. A
required 60% majority supported a more structured SAS but structure was
diluted in order to get unanimity. For example, a requirement for "preliminary
estimates" of materiality was replaced by the more vague "judgments about"
materiality. Also, in an attempt to make the SAS "less quantitative in tone,"
the title was changed from "Materiality and Audit Risk" to "Audit Risk and
Materiality."
SAS No. 55 is peculiar in that it is arguable whether it adds more structure
than it removes. It is also peculiar in that its task force is the first to be chaired
by a member of the AICPA staff. In contrast to SAS No. 47, the SAS No. 55
chairman apparently did not try to accommodate all suggestions for improvement. Ironically, if the chairman had achieved unanimity, then SAS No. 55
would have been a stronger document since the dissenters were asking for
more guidance or clarity rather than less. In fairness to the task force
chairman, political expediency may have necessitated foregoing further rigor
and clarity.

SAS No. 55 and the "Expectations Gap"
Now, I'll discuss specifics of the Sullivan paper. I'll be very specific as to
references so that you can verify my statements. On page 47, Jerry states that
the nine new SASs were developed to "narrow what has been referred to as
the 'expectations gap.'" Among the new standards is SAS No. 55 that
"dramatically changes" the auditor's responsibility for considering internal
control.
If we accept Jerry's premise, then we would reasonably expect to see the
following in a discussion of "why" AU 320 needed to be replaced:
a. First, we would expect to see a description, listing, or citation of a
number of highly visible audit failures due to the application of
guidance in AU 320—that is, audits for which the auditor had properly
applied the guidance and yet failed to detect material error.
b. Second, we would expect to see a focus in SAS No. 55 on audit
effectiveness. The SAS would provide means of increasing audit
effectiveness through guidance to prevent the abuses noted.
c. Third, we would not expect to see extensive discussion of efficiency
or how to do an audit more cheaply or with less work since Dingell
hasn't criticized the profession for being inefficient.
How well does Jerry's paper and SAS No. 55 meet these three expectations?
First, let us consider the evidence on audit failures due to following AU 320.
On page 48, Jerry cites a "growing number" of practitioners who use
preprinted memorandums proclaiming "no reliance on controls" yet rely on
"effectively operating internal controls." We don't know if "growing" means
from one to two or from 10,000 to 11,000 auditors, and Jerry doesn't claim that
these audits were improper or ineffective.
On pages 48 and 49 he states that AU 320 and SAS No. 47 direct the
auditor's attention toward internal control procedures related to account
balances and transactions and not to the accounting system or control
environment "which most practitioners believe reduce control risk.'' Now, if
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auditors don't rely on controls that they don't study or evaluate, then by not
looking at the accounting system and control environment the audit may be
inefficient. However, the audit would not necessarily be ineffective!
On pages 49 and 50, Jerry cites research conducted at Coopers and
Lybrand. No reference is given so apparently this is secret research about
which one can't determine the methods used, the data examined, or whether
there wereflawsin their application or alternative interpretations of the results.
According to the secret C&L research [Sullivan, 1988, page 49] "the problem
is not with specific internal control procedures; rather it is related to the
attitude, awareness and actions of management related tofinancialreporting."
[emphasis added]
Therefore, Jerry concludes that, we ought to audit management's attitude
and awareness more and audit transactions and balances less. This is
consistent with the views expressed in his 1984 Kansas paper [Sullivan, 1984]
in which he championed reliance on supervisory controls verified by observation and inquiry over reliance on transaction and balance controls verified by reperformance.
The idea that, because few errors are discovered in tests of transactions
and balances, we can deemphasize or even eliminate them is bothersome for
two reasons. First, the auditor contracts to do an audit. The public expects that
an auditor has audited transactions and balances, not just verified that
management has a good attitude and awareness. Second, auditing behavior is
dynamic or strategic—an analogy will suffice as explanation. There are very few
guns detected at Kansas City International Airport. Yet, if gun control were
reduced or eliminated, I believe that there would be many more guns leaving
the jetway. Anticipation of detection yields prevention.
If the official audit literature is to emphasize management's good attitude
and awareness as a basis for assessing low control risk, then I believe that the
ASB should tell us how much the auditor can rely on management's general
good "attitude and awareness" to reduce substantive testing across particular
accounts and balances. Is it a lot? Can it be 100%? Or is it a very small amount?
There are repeated efficiency reminders in SAS No. 55. For example,
paragraphs 31, 40-42, and 43-45 remind the auditor that results from testing
one assertion for one account may be useful in reducing testing in another.
Paragraph 48 and 50-52 give compliance tests as options for reliance. The
auditor is also encouraged to rely on favorable audit results from last year
[para. 23, 53]. It is not that the auditor should not consider such evidence, it is
just peculiar that a document designed to increase audit effectiveness is directed
at being efficient or, perhaps, the ex post legal protection of the auditor. There is
only one warning and no examples that evidence from varied sources may
conflict with or "disconfirm'' each other. Such examples and warnings would
likely increase effectiveness.
Finally, I'm very troubled by the suggestion, in paragraph 63, that the
auditor try tofigureout means of placing complete reliance on an assessment of
low control risk. That is, the auditor would conduct no substantive tests for an
assertion. The auditor is warned that "ordinarily" one cannot do this for all
assertions on a significant account, but there is no guidance as to whether
substantive testing should be the exception or whether complete reliance on
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controls is the exception. (It should be noted that the new SAS on Analytical
Review reduces this risk.)
According to Sullivan [1988], SAS No. 55 provides aframeworkto improve
control risk assessment in two respects:
1. It establishes a requirement to assess controls in relation to financial
statement assertions (presumably all five assertions for each financial
statement caption).
2. It replaces an "all or nothing," "rely or don't rely" approach with a
more continuous approach such as percentages, or "maximum,
moderate or minimum.''
Now, does anyone really believe that we needed a new SAS to explain that
AU 320 applies to assertions? I doubt it. Second, I cannot find any statement in
AU 320 that dictates an "all or nothing" approach. In fact, paragraphs 72 and
73 of the original SAP No. 54 (now AU 320, 81-82) are explicit in discussing a
variable extent of reliance and Appendix B [paragraph 35] illustrates reliance as
being 30%, 50%, 70%, or 90%! That hardly sounds like all or nothing/rely or
don't rely. Something is wrong here.
Overall, I'm not sure what is going on. There is a political problem for the
profession. Is there an expectations gap (an effectiveness problem)? Is AU 320
part of it? Is SAS No. 55 more than the product of political-economic actions by
the ASB?
As we have seen, if the Sullivan explanation is correct, there are some
surprises in the data. There are no specific abuses listed nor locatable
references to abuses. There is little, if any, increase in effectiveness of SAS
No. 55 over AU 320 and there is a concentration on efficiency. None of those
supports the claim that SAS No. 55 is needed to close the alleged expectations
gap.
If you follow the ASB's activities, you know that the Sullivan paper is the
fourth in a series of papers that "explain," "sell," or "excuse" SAS No. 55.
One is by Dan Guy and Jerry Sullivan in the April, 1988 issue of Journal of
Accountancy [Guy and Sullivan, 1988], a second is by ASB member Bob
Temkin and Al Winters in the May, 1988 issue of Journal of Accountancy
[Temkin and Winters, 1988], and a third will appear in the June, 1988 issue of
Journal of Accountancy and will explain how one should apply SAS No. 55 to
small firms. With an apparent lack of "effectiveness'' differences from AU 320,
these papers seem to be much like advertising for "new and improved"
laundry soap.

Closing Statement
In his closing statement, Jerry states that Congressman Dingell has often
asked how auditors can examinefinancialstatements and not know about their
clients' internal controls. Further, he states that the answer, "I didn't rely on
internal controls" doesn't play very well.
I am very concerned that the answers given in SAS No. 55 won't play very
well. That is, in defense of an audit failure, I would not like to hear:
"I didn't do much substantive testing because management had such a
good attitude toward controls." or,
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"I didn't do much substantive testing because management had such
a good system last year."
Now these responses seem silly to the uninitiated. But you, Jerry, and Al
Winters, and Dan Guy, and anyone else who has reviewed the files know that
such responses will be observed in future peer reviews and perhaps in court
cases. I, for one, would be hard-pressed to say that the particular words in SAS
No. 55 don't lend some support to that position.
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